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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah

LORAINE J. WHITE
Plaintiff a'Yld Respondent

vs.
NATIONAL POSTAL TRANSPORT

Case No. 7829

ASSOCIATION, formerly RAILWAY MAIL ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and .App,ellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent believes that a detailed statement of
facts in this case will be of benefit to the C:ourt because
the questions of law presented on this appeal must be
determined from the factual picture presented. It should
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be noted that the references to the record which follow
throughout this brief are to the ·pages numbered in red
by the Clerk of Court, and have no reference to the
typewritten page numbers on the transcript of testimony prepared by the Court Reporter, which latter
numbers are apparently referred to by appellant in
its brief.
There was ~vidence in this case from which the
jury could find the following facts: Milton J. White,
prior to his death, was the holder of a certificate of
insurance issued by the appellant association. The certificate, Exhibit ''A,'' contains an in'suring clause which
provides that the appellant would pay certain disability
benefits if the holder of the certificate ·should receive
bodily injuries through ''external, violent and accidental means" and paragraph 4 of the insuring clause
·p~rovides that if "death shall result from such injuries
alone within one year from the date of injury," the
appellant would pay to the beneficiary, who is respondent herein, the sum of $4,000.00.
Following the insuring paragraphs, there may be
found the exclusion paragraph, in which the term '' accidental death'' .is defined and in which the statement is
made that the appellant should not be liable when "disease, defect or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause
of death. Accidental death is said to be ''either sudden,
violent death ·from external violent and accidental
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means, resulting directly, independently and exclusively
of any other causes . . . ; or death within one year, as
the sole result of accidental means alone."
Milton J. White died February 14, 1950, approximately 5¥2 months after having suffered an injury to
his right leg (R. 51). Respondent filed her claim with
appellant for death benefits, which claim was denied.
This action followed. The record is silent as to whether
appellant denie·d the claim because it believed respondent had not brought herself within the insuring clause,
or because it believed respondent's elaim was prohibited
under the exclusion clause. On trial, appellant claimed
that the death was not the result, ''directly, independently and exclusively'' of the injury to the leg, but
that a heart "disease" and Buerger's disease were,
at least, contributing causes of ·death.
At the time of his death, White was a man 5 feet
11 inches tall, weighed about 155 pounds, and was age
63. When he was a child, he had apparently suffered
from rheumatic fever. In his high school and college
days, he had been extremely active physically, participating in the strenuous sports of track and basketball
(R. 35). In ·his adult life, his hobbies were hunting and
fishing. He was an "outdoor man" and was "very
active.'' He ·had gone on a hunting trip iri the fall ~f
the year prior to the accident (R. 36). He was employed
at the railroad yards in Ogden and his work consisted
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o.f .going about . the yards, from train to train, and
arr~nging for space in mail cars (R. 34, 35). He had
had such work since about 1919 (R. 35) The certificate
of insurance, Exhibit "A," was issued July 8, 1924,
and had been maintained by White for 25~ years prior
to his death.
White had consulted Dr. Goddard in November,
1948 at which time Dr. Goddard believed that he had
suffered a'' splenic infarct,'' or an embolus which struck
the spleen, from which he recovered without incident.
Thereafter, Dr. Goddard treated White with drugs
designed to assist the heart to compensate for the
damage which had been done to it by the -childhood
affliction. of rheumatic fever. Dr. Goddard des~cribed
the condition for .which White was being treated as
"congestive heart failure" (R. 99), which is a condition
wherein the heart is a· ''damaged heart,'' one which
is ''no longer able to handle its load." This is a condition
which ·can be controlled, and there is no reason to believe death will occur suddenly-sudden death is '·'less
apt to occur." (R. 106) TP.e condition was under control. Dr. Olson, the sp·ecialist, said that when he first
saw .the patient, which was after the accident, the
patient ''didn't have symptoms, signs of active inflam·mation in tlie heart" (R. 71) (italics added). Dr. Olson
'stated on the death certificate, Exhibit 2, that the
. heart ·a·1sease was ,'.1nact·1ve. "
rheumatic
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The injury to the leg occurred August 28, 1949, ·at
Dodge City, Kansas, 'vhen son1e men, standing behind
the deceased, jerked a wooden -bench so that the corner
of the bench struck the calf of \V.hite 's right leg a forceful blow (R. 39). The next day, there was a bruise on
the leg, about 2 inches long and one inch wide, running
across the leg (R. 40). \Vhite was in great pain then
and thereafter (R. 41). Prior to the injury, he had never
made any complaint about pain in any part of his body
(R. 41). He complained of pain to such an extent after
the injury that he and his wife cut short their vacation
and started back to Ogden, arriving about September
3, 1949. During the trip home, White found it necessary
to sit on the back seat of the car, with his leg extended
along the seat (R. 41). He arrived home, took a bath,
went to bed -and Dr. Goddard was called. He hospitalized
the patient at once and stated that White was in congestive heart failure at that time.
By the time White was p~laced in the hospital, the

leg was showing definite signs of -getting worse. The
"little blood vessels ... were breaking. It was like a
spider web, ·discolored under the skin'' ( R. 42). The
area involved was now all over the lower leg, and on the
foot (R. 42.). The doctors felt there was an imp,airment of circulation and decided to operate in an effort
to locate the point of circulation stoppage and remove
the clot or other impairment. An embolectomy was ·p,er-
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formed on or about Septe1nber 8, 1949, but it did no
good (R. 70). Nine days later, White was taken home.
The leg continued to get worse, and by late October, it
was shiny black, like "patent leather" and the toes on
the foot were "curled right up-dead" (R. 44, 45). On
O·ctober 27, 1949, the leg was amputated at a point 5 em.
above the knee (Ex. 5) and a ~pathological examination
reveale·d that the vessels of the leg were afflicted with
''obliterating thrombo-angiitis,'' which is Buerger's
disease. (R. 105). Following the amputation, White
was taken home and thereafter became steadily weaker
and was bed-ridden until the time of his death (R. 46).
With reference to Buerger's disease, Dr. Olson testified that it is "probably correct" that trauma or injury
''often serves as a starting point of the gangrenous
lesion,'' as stated by a recognized medical authority in
discussing gangrene (R. 78). There was no evidence
of the presence of Buerger's disease prior to the time
Dr. Olson was called on the case (R. 45). The record
reveals nothing from which it might be said that the
disease was present ·and if it was present, it was latent
and unknown. The doctors were not treating him for
Buerger's disease (R. 79).
The shock from the two operations, the subsequent
bed rest, the nausea, violent retching and vomiting, were
said to be sufficient to act upon White's previous condition so as to "move it into being, or move it into life
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again'' and these circumstances also were sufficient
to aid in loosening a clot of blood in the system. ( R. 71,
72). An embolus is a portion of a clot, in medical p~arlance.
The three doctors who testified apparently were all
of the opinion that an embolism had occurred in the
body of White just prior to his death February 14, 1950.
Dr. Olson said it was, in his judgment, more likely a
cerebral embolism, but admitted it was. ''quite possible''
it could have been a pulmonary embolism (R. 82). Dr.
Peltzer said that, statistically, a ·cerebral embolus was
most likely (R. 113, 114). Dr. Goddard refused to state
what the exact cause of death was since ·he was not
present at the time, and had been off the case for
several weeks prior to death. However, he stated the
leg injury "necessarily" had a causal ·connection with
death (R. 101).
The diagnosis in the ·death ·certificate, Exhihit 2, of
''cerebral embolism'' or ''embolus in the brain'' was not
conclusive, in the absence of an autopsy (R. 115), and
the term ''cerebral embolism'' shows where the embolus
ultimately came to rest, not the point from which it
started (R. 96). The cause of death could have been
a "pulmonary embolism" or embolus in the lung (R. 82),
but even if the embolus had gone to the brain, it could
have originated either in the heart or in the leg. It might
have originated in the leg because of the fact that there
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is "a likelihood of thrombus forming at the site of an
operation" (R. 94). In Dr. ·Olson's opinion, if the embolus had come from the leg it would have been an ''uncommon'' situation, but it nevertheless could have happened if the patient had had an abnormal opening in
the ''two chambers'' of the heart (R. 94). There is no
way to tell whether this patient had such an abnormal
opening without an autopsy. Such an embolism going
from the leg to the brain is called a ''paradoxical embolism.'' If that occurred in this case, according to Dr.
Olson, the events that made surgery necessary "had a
casual connection with the production of thrombus,
the patient's embolus, and death" (R. 95). The doctors
were all in agreement that an injury of the kind suffered
by Mr. White is more or less severe and se.rious, depending upon the condition of the person upon whom
the injury is inflicted and depending upon whether that
person has within his system conditions or diseases,
known or unknown, upon which such an injury can act
or which can be activated by such an injury.
In summarization of the medical evidence which
was before the jury, it may be said that all the doctors
agreed that an embolus was present in this case, but
none of the doctors was certain as to its origin, its route
of travel, or its final resting place, although they believed
it more likely that it ·came to rest in the brain. The
doctors were in disagreement as to the condition of the
patient prior to the injuryr. Dr. Peltzer described his
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condition as ''a serious cardiac disease,'' while Dr.
Goddard said the condition was ''under control'' with
death unlikely, and Dr. Olson said that there were no
symptoms or signs of "active inflammation" and that
the rheumatic heart condition was "inactive" (Exhibit
2). Dr. Peltzer's testimony, of course, was hypothetical
since he had never seen the patient, while the other
doctors had each been in attendance upon the patient
before the injury and afterward.
From this ·state of facts, the jury was required to
answer at least the following questions:
1. Was the heart condition of Milton White a
condition which was not active prior to the injury~
2. If his condition was inactive prior to injury,
did the injury reactivate it and create conditions which
led directly to his death Y
3. Were the conditions of Buerger's disease and a
damaged heart from rheumatic fever in childhood contributing causes to White's death within the meaning of
that term as defined by the Court '-s instruction No. 6 ¥
The jury apparently answered the first two of these
questions in the affirmative and the third in the negative,
because it returned a verdict for the p~laintiff, against
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the defendant, in the amount of the insurance certificate
involved, and 'from the judgment entered upon this
verdict,. this appeal is prosecuted.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
1. THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY ON ALL ISSUES IN THIS
CASE, AND HENCE THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY.
2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
8 AND 9, SINCE THEY REFLECT RESPONDENT'S
"THEORY OF THE CASE".
ARGUMENT
1. THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY ·ON ALL ISSUES IN THIS
CASE, AND HENCE THE COURT DID N·OT ERR IN
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY.

The respondent approached this case upon the
theory that since the cause of death could not be determined with certainty in the absence of an autopsy, it
would be necessary to bring before the trial court and
jury all available factual evidence concerning the physical condition of ·Milton White in the last months of
his life, in order that the jury would be able to weigh
the medical evidence in the light of the objective facts
and thus arrive at a fair determination of the ultimate
truth of the matter. This is not a case wher·e medical
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evidence alone can furnish the answers to the problems
presented, since the doctors \Yho testified w,ere unable
to avoid the admission that death could have occurred in
several different ways. All \Yere agreed that death resulted from an embolus, but all recognized that the basic
facts about the origin, ro-q_te and destination of the
embolus in White's body were, and must be, unknown.
Respondent therefore presented evidence from which
the jury could find either that the injury to White
reactivated or "lighted up" an inactive heart condition, which led to his death, or that the injury started
an unbroken chain of circumstances which led to his
death, independently of any contributing cause. An
examination of the record will reveal evidence to support each theory, and that appellant should be ·held
liable upon either of these theories. Cer-tainly, the record reveals sufficient evidence to require submission
of the case to the jury, as will be demonstrated in the
succeeding argument.
First, there can be no doubt that there was a
violent, painful injury to the leg of Milton White, and
that the injury resulted from external, violent and accidental means. While the injury was not substantial,
compared with some injuries, there is little ·doubt that
it was painful, since the record is uncontradicted that
Mr. and Mrs. White cut short their vacation trip, and
returned from Kansas to Ogden, because of the pain
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and discomfort being suffered by Mr. White. During
the trip home, he was required to keep the leg elevated
on the seat of the car. The day after the injury, a
bruise developed at the site of the bump. The bruise
was two inches in length and one inch wide, with the
length extending horizontally across the calf of the leg.
Six days following the injury, it was apparent even
to non-medical eyes that there was more to the injury
than a mere bruise. A ·circulatory disturbance was beginning to manifest itself. The veins were beginning to
"break up" and they gave a "spider web" appearance.
Both doctors in attendance, Dr. Goddard and Dr. Olson, knew that a circulatory impairment was present
and about 11 or 12 days after the injury, an 01peration,
known as embolectomy, was performed to try to correct the situation. The operation was unsuccessful and
there followed a period of seven weeks in which the
leg became steadily worse. It began to turn black. It
was hard. The toes were curled. up. The pain was
constant and severe and finally, on October 27, 1949,
it became necessary to amputate the leg. The amputation was accomplished in a five-hour operation, and the
leg was removed at a point about 5 centimeters above
the knee.
A p-athological examination was made after amputation and it was noted that there was definite evidence
of Buerger's disease, and that the leg contained black,
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silk-like fibers, such as suture material (Ex. 5 ). There
was no explanation of how this material got in the leg,
or ho\Y it got ''meshed around the artery'', as stated in
the exhibit, but it is reasonable to assume that it came
from the embolecton1y 7 weeks earlier. There was no
indication from the examination of how long Buerger's
disease had been in the leg, or whether the disease was
advanced. The record is silent on the question, except that
there is no suggestion in the evidence that the Buerger's
disease was present prior to the injury. There had never
been any indication of any kind of trouble in White's leg,
and it is reasonable to suppose that had there been such
trouble, it would have been known, either to White's
wife, or to the doctor who examined him v~rior to his
trip. Since the disease affects the circulatory system,
and since White's work required him to be on his feet,
in and about the railroad yards, there is little doubt that
had he had the disease before the injury, he would
have been aware of it.
These are permissible inferences to be drawn from
the record on the question of Buerger's disease, and
when they are coupled with the statement by Dr. Olson
that it is "probably correct" that trauma to the tissues
is often the starting point of the gangrenous lesion,
it is clear that there was evidence to go to the jury on
the question of whether or not the injury to the leg
had a causal relation to the operations of embolectomy
and amputation.
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The record next reveals that following the amputation, in fact, in the weeks immediately preceding it,
White's condition became steadily worse. He became
steadily weaker. He was nauseated. His body was
wracked with spasms of violent retching. He lost weight.
Dr. Goddard testified that the amputation would be
"quite a strain on the man" (R. 101). There is shock
from such operations. Bed rest can have an adverse
effect. All of these conditions were said to be sufficient, in the opinion of Dr. Olson, to act upon White's
previous condition so as to "move it into life again''
or "move it into being". (R. 71, 72) These circumstances were sufficient to aid in loosening a clot of
blood in the system (R. 72). An embolus is a portion
of a clot, in medical parlance.
It was agreed by all the doctors that an embolus,
traveling in the blood stream, lodged in a vital area,
occluding the passage of blood, resulting in death. This
is known as an ''embolism''. That an embolism resulted
in death ap,pears to be conceded. Indeed, no other cause
of death was suggested by any doctor.
Up to this point, the evidence is clear, objective
and largely factual. The speculation among the doctors
begins at this point in the record, and it concerns itself
with the source of the embolus that caused death, its
route of travel, and its lethal lodging place. The jury
necessarily was required to examine the possibilities
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advanced by the doctors and to fit those possibilities to
the objective and factual evidence already before them.
It is here, then, that the t\YO theories, mentioned at the
beginning of the argun1ent on this point, enter the case.
The first theory is that the injury, with the resulting conditions already discussed, reactiva~e~ or ''lighted
up" an inactive heart condition, causing death. But,
appellant says there was no evidence that the heart
conditon was previously inactive, prior to the injury.
The record is to the contrary. Dr. Goddard described
White's condition, and he is the only doctor in the
record who ever saw White before the injury. He said
the heart was ''damaged'' from a childhood disease,
but that the condition was under control. Dr. Olson
said that when he first saw the patient, on September
3, 1949, after the injury, there were ''no symptoms, signs
of active inflammation in the heart'' and there was '' evidence of heart damage caused by a previous rheumatic
condition". (R. 84) (emphasis supplied). Thus, it is
clear that at the time of Dr. Olson's first examination,
the heart condition had not yet been reactivated. Dr.
Olson also testified that ''rheumatic heart disease, where
there is no active inflammation, does not produce pain''
(R. 88) and it is clear, from the record, that White ·had
no pain in the chest, but only in the leg. Finally, Dr.
Olson stated on the death certificate, Exhibit 2, that
the rheumatic heart disease was "inactive". These are
all competent statements, made by competent witnesses,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
in plain language, and the jury was entitled to believe
them. If the jury did believe them, it had substantial
evidence upon which to base its finding that the heart
condition was inactive, prior to injury. While there was
evidence that White had a ''clinically diagnosed'' embolic
episode in the fall of 1948, the jury was entitled to
believe, from the evidence of res·pondent and Dr. Goddard, tha.t there was no further activity of the heart
condition from that time until the month of September,
1949, nearly one year later.
If, then, there was substantial evidence upon which
to find that the heart ·condition was formerly inactive,
there was equally substantial evidence that the injury
led to the gangrenous condition of the leg, which led to
the operations, and then, to the complications following
amputation, and, as Dr. Olson stated, these conditions
were sufficient to "move into being" or "move into
life again'' the previous condition. Since Dr. Olson and
Dr. Peltzer both stated that the active disease manifests
itself by irregular beating, or "fibrillation", and that
such beating allows clots to form, it is at once -clear
that if the inactive heart disease was reactivated, as
the jury ·could well find, one of the things to be expected
would be the formation of blood clots, from which, as
Dr. Peltzer stated, emboli are thrown off (R. 111).
This, then, com'Pletes the evidence upon which the
jury could find appellant liable upon its policy on the
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first of the theories previously mentioned. This theory
is that ,,~ hich is discussed and approved in the case of
Lee v. ~7 ew York L·ife Ins'lt.rance Cou~pany, 95 Utah 445,
82 Pacific 2nd 178. \Y.hile there are factual differences
between that case and this, the principles are the same,
and the evidence presented is just as substantial as that
discussed in the report of the Lee case, particularly
when such evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, as the court must do in determining
'vhether to grant a motion by the defendant for a directed
verdict. In the Lee case, the facts were as follows :
Lee suffered an mJury to his body, on the lower
right side of his trunk. There was no mark on the
body, but there was pain. It was not until a month after
the accident, during which time Lee could "walk about
and leave the house", that an examination was made,
and it was determined that there was an acute inflammation active in Lee's system. An operation was performed, resulting in the location and removal of his
appendix. Exploring further, the surgeon found a ruptured gall bladder and the doctor testified that the gall
bladder was infected and was the sole ·cause of death.
The chain of causation utilized in the Lee case was that
the blow to the body ruptured the gall bladder, which
caused infection to spread, which infection attacked the
appendix, which made necessary the operation, leading
to death. This Court, in upholding a verdict for plaintiff, said: "If "Dr. Pearce be believed, and the jury
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had a right to believe him, the diseased condition of
the gall bladder was not actively progressing and it
afforded no reason to believe that death might be imminent." In the case at bar, both Doctor Olson and Doctor
Goddard gave evidence, previously outlined, that White's
heart condition was not actively progressing and there
was no reason to believe death might be imminent. It
is clear that this case and the Lee case are the same
in principle.
Appellant urges, however, that the Lee case does
not apply and that this case is controlled by the case of
Tucker vs. New York Life Inswra;nce Com;,pany, 107 Utah
478, 155 Pacific 2d 173. This ·claim is made because in
the Tucker case the court denied liability upon the
theory that the ' 'chronic and progressing'' disease cooperated with the broken arm to produce death. That
there are basic differences in fact and principle between
the Tucker case and the instant case is so obvious that
it scarcely requires discussion. There is no evidence in
this case from which the jury could find the existence
of a "chronic and progressing" condition. In the Tucker
case the doctors testified that ''atherosclerosis changes"
had been present in the patient for more than a year
with "increased blood pressure during that period",
and further testified that "it is a chronic condition and
slowly advancing'' (emphasis supplied). Another differ·
ence in the cases is that in the Tucker case there was
an autopsy and the pathologist was able to determine
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the exact nature of death. The doctors were in agreement on all major causal factors. In the instant case,
however, the doctors \Yere reduced to giving opinions
\vhich were not certain, and \Yere required to admit in
all honesty that there were many possibilities which
could have resulted in the death.
In the case at bar there is no evidence that Milton
White's damaged heart \Yas becoming worse in the
period leading up to the accident, and in no sense can
it be said that his condition was ''chronic and slowly
advancing" as \\~as true of the victim in the Tucker
case. Even after the injury, Dr. Olson testified that
there was no active inflammation noted by him in the
patient's heart, and there is an obvious difference,
therefore, between the condition of White at that time
and the condition of Nichols in the Tucker case. While
it is true that the doctors in the instant case were required
to reduce their testimony to opinions based upon judgment and to probabilities or possibilities, the jury was
entitled to believe that portion of the doctors' testimony
which would lend support to the plaintiff's case.
The second theory mentioned at the ·beginning of
this argument was that the injury started an unbroken
chain of circumstances leading to Milton White's ·death,
independently of any contributing cause. As has been
indicated, it was conceded that death was caused by
an embolism. There was ample evidence from which
the jury could find that the accidental injury led to the
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gangrenous condition of the leg, which in turn made
necessary the embolectomy and the amputation. Like.
wise, there was ample evidence that the amputation,
with its resultant shock arid because of the fact that an
amputation enables blood clots to form, could have
caused the formation of a blood clot, and the complications following the operation could have caused the clot
to break up or loosen so that an embolus could be released into the blood stream.
·On this theory of the case there is little difference,
except as to the weight of evidence, whether or not
the embolus lodged in the brain or in the lung. Much
was made upon trial of the fact that the embolus was
more likely to have lodged in the brain and that such an
occurrence was more likely to have occurred from an
embolus coming from the heart. However, the evide~ce
indicated other possibilities as we will show.
In support of this second theory of the plaintiff,
it may be said that there was evidence from which the
jury could find that the embolism which caused death
was a pulmonary embolism. Dr. Olson so testified. He
also testified that blood clots very often form at the
situs of an operation such as the amputation. If the
lethal embolus was a piece of such a blood clot, it would
require no unusual condition for it to travel in the
system to the lung and cause death. Such an occurrence
is, to quote Dr. Olson. "Quite possible" (R. 82), and to
quote Dr. Peltzer, "Quite likely" (R. 115).
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If, however, the jury chose to believe that the embolism occurred in the brain, there \Yas still evidence
from which the jury n1ight have found that such a cerebral embolisn1, nevertheless, could have originated in
the leg. HaYing in mind that blood clots form at the
point of operation, it will be remembered that Dr.
Olson testified· that an embolus can reach the brain if
there .is an abnormal opening in the chambers of the
heart. Such an embolism is called a ''paradoxical embolism'' and is, in the words of Dr. Olson, ''uncommon''
and, according to Dr. Peltzer, "rare". However, since
no autopsy 'vas performed, Dr. Olson stated that there
is no way to tell "\Yhether Milton White had such an
abnormal opening, and therefore no way to tell if this was
in fact a paradoxical embolism. He would not rule out
the possibility, despite counsel's attempt (R. 92) to get
him.to say that it was an impossibility.
From all of the foregoing argument, it is ·clear that
the plaintiff had met the requirements of proving her
case, and even if it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that some of the testimony produced upon plaintiff's case was not of as great weight as might be desired,
it is obvious, nevertheless, that substantial evidence was
produced to go to the .jury on each of the theories mentioned. In determining whether or not the Trial Court
should have granted a motion for directed verdict, it
must be remembered that the evidence of the plaintiff is
to be tested in the light most' favorable to the plaintiff,
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and when that test is applied, there can be no doubt
that plaintiff met and satisfied her burden of proof.
Appellant seems to complain that some of plaintiff's
evidence was speculative in nature. It is submitted
however, that the testimony of the doctors in this case'
has considerably more strength and weight than the
testimony upheld by this Court in the case of Cla;yton
vs. Metropolita;n Life lns'Uiflwnce Compam;y, 96 Utah 331,
85 Pacific 2d 819, wherein plaintiff's case was upheld
upon testimony by a physician that he thought that
the condition of the deceased "might''' have been caused
by the injury sustained by the deceased (emphasis
added).
In summary, it may be said that the first theory
discussed is the theory of the Lee ·case, supra, and that
if the jury decided to follow the second theory, that is
the theory discussed .and advanced in the case of
Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94
Utah 532, 72 Pacific 2d 1060, in which these cases are
divided into categories, and in which it is stated that
the insurer will he liable where the insured is afflicted
with a condition at the time of the accident, but the
condition had no causal connection with the injury or
death and the injury started an unb-roken chain of
circumstances resulting in death without the intervention of any other cause.
We therefore submit that the Court did not err in
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overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict
and allo"'i.ng this case to be considered by the jury.
2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
8 AND 9, SINCE THEY REFLECT RESPONDENT'S
"THEORY OF THE CASE".

The principles of law applicable in a discussion
of Point 2 in this brief have been discussed many times
by this Court in reviewing law cases where complaint
has been made concerning instructions that were given
or refused by the Trial Court.
It is a well known p~rinciple ·of law that each party
to a law suit is entitled to have his theory of the case
submitted to the jury, if there is evidence to support
that theory. As was said by this Court in the case of
Hartley vs. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pacific .522,
''There are two parties to a law suit. Each, on a submission of the case to the jury, is entitled to a submission of it on his theory and the law in respect
thereof.''
In Toone vs. O"Neill Construction Company, 40
Utah 2'65, 121 Pacific 10, complaint was made of an
instruction given by the Trial Court which was claimed
to be too broad in view of the evidence. The · Court
stated '' ... we concede that a party is entitled to have
his case submitted to the jury upon the theory of his
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evidence as well as upon the theories of the whole evidence. One way the Court might have followed in
charging the jury would have been to charge them in
separate instructions, first, in aecordance with respondent's evidence; and, second, in accordance with appellant's evidence . . . and in each instruction to have
directed the jury to return a verdict in accordance with
the findings upon that question."
While these cases are not new, they are considered
to be leading cases and have been repeatedly referred to
by the Court in recent years. See Webb vs. Snow, 132
Pacific 2d 114, and Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151,
132 Pacific 2d 114. In Morrison vs. Perry, this Court
quotes with approval the suggestion contained in Toone
vs. O'Neill, supra.
Applying these principles to the instructions in
this case, it is at once apparent that the appellant's
theory was presented to the jury in Instruction No. 6,
and had the jury found the facts necessary to support
that instruction, the appellant no doubt would have
recovered a verdict. The respondent's theories were
presented in Instructions Nos. 8 and 9.
Instruction No. 8 is the instruction which says, in
substance, that the mere fact that Milton H. White had
ailments or infirmities of the body which deprived him
of normal powers of resistance would not preclude a
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recovery by his widow if the jury should find that the
claimed injury \Yas a real, direct and efficient cause. of
his death. The language used reflects the theory discussed by this Court in the case of Griffin vs. Prudential
Ins~trance Cou~;pany, 102 Utah 363, 133 Pacific 2d 333. Instruction No. 8, in fact, is almost identical with the
instruction approved in the Griffin case.
It is conceded that the Griffin case is not on all
fours with this case and that the facts were 'substantially different. However, the principle of ~aw therein
announced, and which had previously been announced
by this Court in the Browning case, is a proper· principle to be applied to this case. In the Browning case
this Court remarked that all people probably have, in
their systems microbes, germs and bacteria of many
diseases. The Court then went on to say "because . in
warding off such possible diseases we may be in · -~
weakened condition of strength and resistance, we m_ay
the more readily succumb to an injury accidentally
sustained by external violence. The injury, in the presence of the disease germs in the system, would· still be
the cause of death or disability·."
Any construction of an insurance policy whereby
the insurance company would -be relieved of liability
because of some condition or departure from normal,
would reduce insurance contracts to an absurdity. If
such a construction . were followed, as urged by the
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appellant, no person holding an accident insurance policy
could be sure of protection and coverage for himself,
because many of us are afflicted with damaged organs
or impaire·d bodily functions of which we are not aware.
TYJp,ical of the attitude taken by modern courts on
this question is that found in the case of Kearney vs.
Washington National Insurance Company, 52 Pacific 2d
903, decided by the Supreme Court of Washington. In
that case there was evidence which indicated that the
insured had a con<lition of arthritis and :arteriosclerosis.
He suffered a fall, and the next day was blind in one
eye. There was evidence that the arteriosclerosis had
affected the left eye. The Washington Supreme Court,
in upholding a verdict for the insured, quoted with
approval from the Michigan Supreme Court in the case
of Kangas vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 223
Michigan 238, 193 N.W. 867, wherein the Court stated
' 'In most cases a policy of this character would be of
little or no value to the insured if the limiting language
be literally interpreted, as claimed by the defendant.
Death from an external injury, unless instantaneous, is
usually the result of various concurring causes. The
injury sets in motion other agencies and awakens
dormant internal ailments which contribute to death.
These are conditions rather than causes. If such
insurance contracts are to be of any value to the man
who pays for the risk assumed, a construction as fair
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and reasonable as the limiting language will permit
should be placed upon them.''
Appellant's argument concerning Instruction No. 9
is, in substance, that the instruction sets forth the doctrine of the Lee case but that there is no evidence to
support such a doctrine in this case. It is submitted
that that contention has already been answered in .the
first portion of respondent's argument, and that an
examination of the record will reveal evidence to support each step necessary to bring the Lee case to bear
upon this case.
Appellant also says that the instruction · '~opened
the door to sheer speculation, bias, and prejudice.''
Nowhere in the record have we been able to find any
hint of bias or prejudice. There is, of course, specul~ . .
tion in the record because the doctors all admitted. that
there were various possibilities for the source, rout~,
and destinati9n of the embolus which caused death. As
has been demonstrated, however, respondent should be
entitled to recover upon either of two theories, both of
which find support in the possibilities advanced by the
doctors.
When closely analyzed, aprp~ellant's contention· is
merely a quarrel with the weight of the evidence. The
question of the weight of the evidence and the cr~di-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

bility of the witnesses was for the jury, and only for
the jury.
Where the jury has brought before it a case comp.osed of objective fact, considered medical opinion, and
speculative medical opinion, there is little doubt that
the jury's task is much more difficult to perform, but
this situation occurs in almost every case where medical
testimony is given concerning human ailments. Medicine is not an exact science, Anderson vs. Nixon, 104
Utah 262, 139 Pacific 2nd, 216, and where the doctors
testify as to two possibilities, the jury should be free
to accept that possibility which, to their minds, most
nearly fits the objective, known and uncontradicted facts
before them.
Applying that principle to this case, it is difficult
to see how the jury could have held other than it did
when it is remembered that prior to the injury Milton
White was in no danger of imminent death and was, in
fact, actively engaged on a job requiring full use of
his physical faculties. 5~ months. later he was dead,
after having lost the greater portion of his leg, and
after having been reduced to a comparative shell -of his
former self. Those are admitted facts and could not
be contradicted in the eyes of the jury. It is, therefore,
logical, natural and pro~per that the jury, having those
facts in mind, should choose to believe whatever medical ...
evidence was before them which would tend to give a
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reason for the infirmities and death of Milton· White.
The jury 'vas not required to believe the appellant's
,vitness, Dr. Peltzer, and particularly is this true when
it is recalled that the jury 'vitnessed, throughout the trial,
Dr. Peltzer in constant attendance upon ap·pellant 's
counsel, suggesting questions to be asked, and generally
taking the part of appellant's side of the case prior to
the time he took the witness stand. Confronted by this
situation, and realizing that Dr. Peltzer testified entirely
upon the basis of facts told to him and not upon the
basis of his actual experience with the patient, the. jury
could hardly be expected to give as much weight and
credibility to his testimony as· to the testimony of Dr.
Goddard and Dr. Olson.
One other point should be mentioned in connection
with the instructions. It is a familiar princirp~le that
instructions should be examined as a whole. When the
Court's entire charge to the jury is examined in· this
case, it seems abundantly clear that the jury was instructed so that the theories of both plaintiff and defendant were adequately and properly brought before the
jury. It must be presumed that the jury examined and
heeded all of the instructions and did .not single out any
particular instruction. When this presumption is considered, together with the substantial evidence which
has been previously discussed, there can be no doubt
that the court's instructions were free from error.
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Therefore, we submit that the Court did not commit error in giving its Instructions Nos. 8 and 9, and
that these instructions merely presented plaintiff's
''theory of the case'' and ·should, therefore, be sustained.
CONCLUSION

Much of the speculation discussed by both parties
to this law suit might have been avoided had the appellant exercised its right to an autopsy on the body of
Milton White. This right is given to the appellant by
its by-laws and constitution (Ex. 6), and had an auto~psy
been performed, it is likely that the doctors would have
been able to be much more specific in their testimony.
Inasmuch as the .autopsy was not performed, and inasmuch as respondent presented all available evidence
bearing upon the issues in this case, and since there was
substantial evidence which, if believed by the jury,
would entitle· her to a verdict, it is submitted that the
verdict and judgment were legally proper and morally
just and should be affirmed by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
D. A. SKEEN and
JOHN H. SN,OW

Attorneys for Respondent
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